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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

GEORGE M. MECHAM,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 14084

GAIL T. MECHAM,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a divorce action where Plaintiff and Respondant (hereinafter referred to as Plaintiff) alleged mental
distress and physical anguish and asked for custody of the
minor child, no award of alimony for defendant, division
of the property, among other things. Defendant and Appellant (hereinafter referred to as Defendant) filed an Answer
and Counterclaim for divorce on grounds of mental cruelty
and physical anguish and asked for custody of the minor
child, reasonable and adequate child support and reasonable
and adequate alimony, among other things.

- 2 DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Court below granted Plaintiff and Defendant a
divorce on grounds of mental cruelty•

The Court awarded

custody of the minor child to Plaintiff, retaining jurisdiction for a period of one year, subject to very liberal
visitation rights.
Defendant filed a Motion for a New Trial pursuant to
Rule 59 (a) U.R.C.P. and, in the Alternative, Motion to
Amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and to Alter
and Amend Judgment pursuant to Rules 52 (b) and 59 (c)
U.R.C.P., said motions being denied.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks a reversal of the award of care, custody and control of the minor child.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Complaint was filed by the Plaintiff, George M.
Mecham, on May 28, 1974.

A Notice of Taking Deposition

was set for June 6, 1974 of the Plaintiff.

On June 4, 1974,

a Stipulation was entered into by the parties providing for
each party to be awarded a divorce on finding of grounds,
temporary custody of the minor child in the Defendant for

- 3 two months and permanent custody based on her performance
during the interim period, and, also, provision for conduct
of the parties, child support and alimony, tempo.rary_property distribution and permanent property distribution,
attorney's fees, and issues reserved for determination by
the Court, namely:

award of custody, child support and

alimony.
Defendant filed an Answer and Counterclaim on June 24,
1974.

A Preliminary Injunction was issued on July 19, 1974,

restraining Plaintiff from harassing the Defendant until
trial date.

On October 21, 1974, an Order was issued keeping

the parties from having anyone of the opposite sex, the party
may be dating, present with the minor child.

On August 11,

1974, Defendant's Petition for Appointment of Independant
Counsel for Minor Child was heard and denied.

On November

25, 1974, Plaintiff's Motion for Continuance and Motion for
Pre-Trial Hearing was heard and denied.
Trial was held on November 29, 1974, December 2, 3, and
4, 1974, and March 14, 1975.
The evidence adduced at trial was as follows:
Plaintiff attended George Washington University Law
School and was admitted to the Utah State Bar on May 1967.
(Tr. 130)

He was previously married August 1963 (Tr. 168)

but divorced on October 23, 1970. (Tr. 167, 200)

He met

Defendant, who was then a stewardess for Western Airlines

- 4 (Tr. 9) in September 1968 and started dating her, (Tr. 222)
During the courtship, there were frequent representations by
Plaintiff to Defendant regarding his marital status, (Tr, 169,
170) even to the extent of Defendant being shown by Plaintiff
documents purporting to be divorce papers. (Tr. 170, 223-226)
Also, there appeared to be excessive drinking (defined as
"three times a week to the point where you are staggering
drunk"), proffer of an engagement ring and continual misrepresentations by Plaintiff to Defendant (Tr. 12, 223-227) the
culmination of which was her attempted suicide by taking an
overdose of aspirins. (Tr. 11, 12, 141, 170, 227)
The parties were finally married on November 7, 1970.
(Tr. 10, 222,227)
The minor child , Andrew, was born April 26, 1971. (Tr.
227)

Three months after his birth, Defendant was suffering

severe depression caused by the death of her grandmother and
Plaintifffs being out, drinking and lying during her pregnancy and she saw Dr. Peter Nielson, a Psychiatrist.

(Tr.

19, 20, 125, 170, 227, 235, 237, 268)
After their marriage, the parties moved into an apartment (Tr. 280) where they resided until October 1971 (Tr.
228) or November 1972 (Tr. 281-282) when they moved into
their home at 1459 Yale Avenue in Salt Lake City. (Tr. 281282)

They resided there as a family until May 24, 1974.

(Tr. 164)

At the time of the trial, Plaintiff was thirty-

- 5 five (35) years old (Tr. 129) and Defendant was twenty-nine
(29) years old (Tr. 5 ) , and employed in listing conversion
with Mountain Bell. (Tr. 10)
The marriage has been described as "tumultuous". (Tr.
11, 133, L66, 167, 234, 235, 267)

From the beginning of

the courtship and during the course of the marriage, Plaintiff lied, (Tr. 12, 125, 167, 170, 223-226, 228-230, 232)
drank excessively, (Tr. 12, 125, 223-228, 232-235, 238, 240,
268, 269) was involved with other women (Tr. 230-232, 309)
and had extra-marital affairs (Tr. 259, 306, 308, 310, 315316).

He stayed out late at night and came home drunk, (Tr.

125, 133, 228-233, 235,238) abused Defendant, (Tr. 234-236)
used foul and abusive language in her presence (Tr. 174)
and in the presence of the minor child (Tr. 251), came home
drunk in the presence of the minor child, (Tr. 175, 232-233,
236) threatened to put a knife in Defendant's stomach, (Tr.
235-236) demeaned her, among other things, by saying "I hate
you" in the presence of his parents (Tr. 231) and "get in
the bedroom and spread your legs".

(Tr. 237)

Defendant, admittedly, is not totally without fault.
When provoked because of his conduct, lying, drinking, staying
out late, (Tr. 305) she has physically assaulted him, (Tr.
22, 268), used foul language (Tr. 179) but not in-the presence of the minor child (Tr. 270) and locked Plaintiff out
of the home. (Tr. 13-14, 178)

She has been under the

- 6influence of intoxicating beverages, but mainly at social
functions together with Plaintiff. (Tr. 294-301)

There is

no evidence she has engaged in any immoral conduct in the
presence of her child, or any conduct which was detrimental
to the child. (Tr. 27-28, 31-34, 34-35, 38, 118-119)

She

has not denied her liason with another man starting in May,
1974, the month the divorce complaint was filed, (Tr. 22-27,
31, 39-41, 46) none of the conduct between them which can
be shown to have been detrimental to the minor child.
However, she always has shown herself to be a fit and
proper mother during the course of the marriage. (Tr. 63)
She is bright and intelligent, (Tr. 148) she learns fast,
(Tr. 148, 159) she is well liked, (Tr. 160) she is hard
working and industrious, (Tr. 149) and considerate of others.
(Tr. 160) She is a good mother, (Tr. 29-30, 46-47, 152-154,
260-261, 270, 313) who for the first three and one-half years
(Tr. 11) of her child's life fed, clothed, trained, educated
and nurtured him into a stable child.
115, 120, 185)

(Tr. 63, 71-73, 79,

Witnesses from her employment, (Tr. 147-149,

160-163) neighbor, (Tr. 187-194) personal friend before and
after marriage, (Tr. 184-187) and mutual friend of Plaintiff
and Defendant (Tr. 195-197) have all testified about Defendant's qualities as a person, mother and friend.

They have

described the loving interaction between mother and child.
(Tr. 28-29, 160-163, 184-197)

She has fulfilled all of the

- 7 criteria set down by Plaintiff, Dr. C. Nielson, and Dr.
Tedrow of a good parent. (Tr. 61-67, 71, 73-74, 89, 90,
142, 145, 152-157, 160-163, 185-197)

No evidence was in-

troduced showing that Defendant neglected the child, abused
the child or, in her absence, left the child untended or
in improper care.
Then, there was the second suicide attempt on August
6, 1974.

(Tr. 12, 30, 125, 140)

The continuing stimulus

theory mentioned by Dr. Tedrow appears to apply here. (Tr.
116, 172-174)

She was going through a divorce, out of her

home, (Tr. 14-16, 176, 242) without her child, without adequate funds, without a job, harassed by Plaintiff and under
the pressure of making some very heavy decisions.

(Tr. 13-

14, 117, 134, 139, 164, 172-176, 242-244, 252, 256, 269)
Finally, having her son state he did not want to stay with
her (Tr. 126, 128, 139-140, 269) was the crushing blow.
Andrew was present during this episode and this is the only
instance where Defendant's conduct may have had a detrimental effect on him. (Tr. 140)
In addition, Dr. Cantrell Nielson and Dr. Richard Ferre,
psychiatrists, after interviewing the Plaintiff, Defendant
and seeing the minor child and having knowledge of Defendant's attempts at suicide, both felt the child should be
placed with the mother, the Defendant. (Tr. 52, 59-60, 6263, 334, 336, EX 6-P)

The psychiatrists have considered

- 8 her suicide attempts in their evaluation and have not deemed
it serious enough to hinder her ability to be a mother to
Andrew.

(Tr. 52, EX 6-P)

Plaintiff questions the clinical interview method used
by Dr. C. Nielson, (Tr. 56-57) who was mutually agreed on
by the parties.

Yetf at the last moment, he secures the

services of a psychiatrist, Dr. Jack Tedrow, who uses precisely the same clinical interview method, but without the
benefit of seeing either the Defendant, the minor child or
the paternal grandparents.

(Tr. 93-95, 100)

Likewise, the

limitations of the personal interview method was mentioned,
in questioning with Dr. C. Nielson. (Tr. 93-94)

It is ob-

vious from the testimony of Dr. Tedrow that the information
provided by Plaintiff was unilateral, limited, self-serving
and biased, (Tr. 87, 105, 107) points Plaintiff made about
Dr. C. Nielson1s interview. (Tr. 58)
Dr. Tedrow did testify, however, that a person can be
under stress and depression, a cause of suicide, if going
through divorce, kicked out of the home, loss of the child,
threatened with no money, and no place to live.
100-102, 105, 113)

(Tr. 13,

He further stated there is question of

stability of a person who drinks excessively, lies, uses
foul and abusive language in the presence of his child.
(Tr. 97-98) Finally, the Dr. testified that a mother who
cares for a child for three years, as testified in this

- 9 case, (Tr. 110, 115) and the father is out of the picture,
and there is sparse testimony of the father's contributions
to the nurturing of the child, (Tr. 114, 142-143, 270) the
mother would be the psychological parent; (Tr. Ill) this,
inspite of his statements of the myth of the psychological
parent.

(Tr. 86, 92)

Dr. C. Nielson also states the detri-

mental effect foul and abusive language, derogatory and
demeaning language, intoxicated condition of one in the presence of the child, has.

(Tr. 79)

Also, it is important to observe the sequence of the
psychiatrists.

Dr. C. Nielson was seen during September 26,

27, October 8, 19, 1974; (Tr. 50) Dr. Tedrow during November
14, 20, 27, 1974; (Tr. 94) and Dr. Ferre during December and
thereafter.

(Tr. 324-325)

Both before and after Dr. Tedrow,

the psychiatrists have come up with the same recommendation.
Dr. C. Nielson also found her relationship with Mr. Turpin
not to be detrimental to her ability to care for her child.
(Tr. 53, 84)
Plaintiff produced only one witness besides himself, Dr.
Tedrow.

His testimony has already been commented on. Defen-

dant very charitably observed his virtues toward the child
(Tr. 241) as did two other of Defendant's witnesses (Tr. 193,
198), and one of the witnesses testified since Mr. Mecham's
possession of Andrew, the child is more subdued.

(Tr. 199)

But, nowhere else has he shown any evidence that he is better

- 10 able to care for the child.

He has, only in the abstract,

testified what should be done, not what has been done.
142-145)

(Tr.

In brief, there is little evidence brought out by

Plaintiff that he can do as good or better job as a parent
in raising Andrew, except for his own statement. (Tr. 114,
142-143, 270)
After the second suicide attempt, Defendant voluntarily
gave possession of the child to Plaintiff on or about August
7, 1974, to avoid conflict, inspite of her recollection she
asked for the child back.

(Tr. 256, 257)

Plaintiff pursued the argument that because Defendant
did not initiate legal action to secure custody of the child,
she somehow displayed her lack of concern for the child. (Tr.
31)

Nothing could be further from the truth.

The record

will show efforts were made. More important, Defendant
testified she did not persist because she did not desire to
make a "football" out of the child.

(Tr. 257)

Plaintiff asserts a novel theory about one-to-one relationship regarding Defendant and her child;
he

(Tr. 31, 42, 55, 75)

propounds the thesis that she is incapable of being with

her son alone, but must be in the company of others and therefore has not sustained a one-to-one relationship.
42, 55, 75)

(Tr. 34-

Plaintiff fails to recognize defendant was with

her child constantly.

(Tr. 37, 160-163, 184, 187)

It may be

inferred the stability of the child at the present time is

- 11 because she saw to it he was able to play with other children
on a peer group relationship and widen his horizons with
people other than his parents and grandparents.
71, 73-74, 152, 155-156)

(Tr. 51, 61,

Plaintiff on the other hand, has

scant evidence of any relationship with the child whether
it be one-to-one or otherwise except for his own statement.
(Tr. 114, 142-143)
There is testimony of Plaintiff's harassment of Defendant while she had custody of the child, (Tr. 251-252, 257,
331) but there is no testimony of Defendant's harassment of
Plaintiff while he had the child.

Was the fact the child

was relatively free from symptoms normally caused by divorce
(Tr. 51, 60, 71, 328-329) because Defendant nurtured and
raised the child for the first three years and four months
of his life and did not make a "football" out of him, (Tr.
257) or because Plaintiff had the child for four months out
of the childs life, particularly with no harassment from
the Defendant?
subduedf

There is testimony the child is now more

(Tr. 199) and may be experiencing increasing con-

fusion and insecurity.

(Tr. 330)

The paternal grandparents have made their presence
felt both during the marriage (Tr. 164, 241) and after the
separation.

(Tr. 251-252, 257, 329)

Both psychiatrists

have considered their presence and yet, felt the child
should be given to the Defendant.

(Tr. 83-84, 328, 336)

- 12 The Court ruled it was going to leave custody as is
subject to very liberal visitation.

(Tr. 340)

The Court

then found in its conclusion that the grandparents were
willing to assume the major responsibility for the minor
child and the child was with the grandparents.
341)

(Tr. 340-

The Court further stated, "I don't want to twist the

child up, that's my endeavor and problem."

(Tr. 342) And,

finally, the Court found both parents fit (Tr. 344), and
then stated the custody would be split (Tr. 341) as it was
before.
The Decree of Divorce was entered and became final on
the 28th day of March, 1975. Neither party appealed the
divorce.

Notice of Appeal was filed by the Defendant on

the 17th day of April, 1975, on the award of custody to
the Plaintiff.

ISSUE
The issue present on this appeal is whether the Lower
Court

erred

in its ruling granting the care, custody and

control of the minor child to the Plaintiff.

ARGUMENT
As stated in the Brief of Plaintiff and Appellant in Cox v.
Cox., Ut.2d, 532 P.2d 994(1975) No. 1324Z on pp. 12 and 13 relat-

- 13 -

ing to the discretion of the trial court in divorce matters:
In divorce cases the trial court has considerable
discretion in determining what is equitable, and
upon appeal, the decision of the court as to child
custody will not be reversed unless it is clear
that there was an abuse of discretion. Graziano v.
Graziano, 7 Ut 2d 187, 321 P.2d 931,(1958); Sartain
v. Sartain, 15 Ut 2d 198, 389 P.2d 1023(1964); Sampsell
v Holt, 115 Ut 73,202 P.2d 550,(1949). The reason
most often expressed for this rule is that the trial
court is in an advantaged position to observe the
witnesses and draw conclusions. As was said in
Sampsell v. Holt, at 202 P.2d 554:
"We are not disposed to upset the finding.
The trial court had the opportunity, as
we do not, of seeing the parties and the
witnesses, of observing their demeanor,
and of forming opinions."
Therefore, unless it can be shown that the
mother is unfit, it is proper to leave the children
in her custody.
A.

The plaintiff has not been shown to be unfit as a

mother.
The evidence clearly shows and the Court has found the
Defendant to be a fit mother

(Tr. 51, 71, 344, Ex.6-P).

The weight of the evidence abundantly shows Defendant is
not only a fit mother, she apparently is an extra-ordinary
mother.

She is bright, intelligent, industrious, congenial and

considerate

(Tr. 148, 149, 159, 160).

For 3-1/2 years of

Andrew's life, she has more than adequately, fed, clothed, trained
educated and nurtured him into a stable, well-adjusted child
(Tr. 63, 71, 79, 115, 120, 160-163, 184-187, 187-194, 195-197).
The two psychiatrists, Dr. Cantrell Nielson and Dr. Richard Ferre,

- 14 -

who evaluated her, have found she has adequately met the needs ^
of Andrew (Tr. 52, 59, €0, 62rr63, 334, 336, Ex. 6-P) .

-

Sexual indiscretion bears on the fitness of a parent only
when the child is affected or damaged thereby.

Further, a good

mother may exercise poor judgment as a wife. In Sparks v. Sparks,
29 Ut 2d 263, 508 P. 2d 531 (1973), while having custody of
minor children from a former marriage, the mother cohabited
with a man, not her husband.

The court held that where a

mother's indiscretions have not been found to affect or damage
the child that the mother is not unfit, even though she is
living with a man.

See also, Dearden v. Dearden, 15 Ut 2d 105,

388 P. 2d 230 (1964), Stuber v Stuber, 121 Ut 632, 244 P. 2d
650 (1952), Cooke v. Cooke, 67 Ut 371 (1926) where adultery
was actually proven.
On balance, the evidence shows both parents to have been
sexually indiscreet (Tr. 22-27, 31, 39-41, 46, 230-232, 259,
306, 308-310, 315 346) . Consequently, thre Defendant should no
more than the Plaintiff be penalized for such conduct, particularly since Andrew was unaware of and unaffected by the
indiscretions.

.,-..-•,,,

In weighing other conduct of the parties, the Plaintiff
appears to have disregarded the proper marital decorum befitting a parent.

With consistent regularity

he drank excessively,

stayed out late, lied and caused considerable grief for the
Defendant (Tr. 12, 117, 125, 133, 167, 170, 174, 223-240, 259,

- 15 -

268, 269, 310, 315, 316). In addition, detrimental conduct
affecting Andrew included use of foul and abusive language in
the presence of Andrew, and state of intoxication in the
presence of Andrew (Tr. 175, 232, 233, 236, 251). On provocation,
Defendant retaliated in kind by her language, and behavior (Tr. 13,
14, 22, 178, 179, 268, 270, 294-301), but not in the presence
of Andrew (Tr. 22-38, 118-119).
There is some question about the stability of the Defendant.
The two suicide guestures on the part

of Defendant were

considered by the two psychiatrists who clinically evaluated
her and determined it did not affect her ability to care for
Andrew (Tr. 52, 59-63, 334-366, Ex 6-P). Likewise, the
stability of the Plaintiff must also be questioned.

As Dr.

Tedrow testified, there is concern about the emotional stability
of a person who drinks excessively, lies, uses foul and
abusive language in the presence of his child (Tr. 97, 98),
this in addition to his other bizzare conduct.

This aspect

is particularly important because there was no testimony by
Plaintiff he has reduced or quit his drinking or modified, in
any way, his other behavior nor is he seeking any professional
help for his problems.

Plaintiff, on the other hand, has

continued seeing Dr. Robert Mohr for professional advice and
assistance (Tr. 20-21).
The paternal grandparents availability bears no significance
in cases where both parents are fit. As Dr. Cantrell Nielson

- 16 -

stated, "grandparents should be grandparents and not substitute parents, period-" (Tr. 84). At 35 years of age (Tr. 129),
it is presumed Plaintiff is capable of being a parent.
As pointed out in the Cox Brief, supra, page 15, unfitness depriving a parent of custody must be a positive and not
a contemplative or comparative matter.

As pointed out above,

the two psychiatrists who had the opportunity to give a
clinical evaluation of both parents were clear and precise in
their recommendation to the court.

The third psychiatrist,

Dr. Jack Tedrow, interviewing the Plaintiff and based on
inadequate information, suggested a comparative evaluation
without seeing the Plaintiff or Andrew (Tr. 93-95, 100). There
appeared to be relative agreement by even Dr. Tedrow there is
such a thing as a psychological parent (Tr. Ill). In this case,
the psychological parent was and is the Defendant.
Based on Wisconsin cases, it was stated in the article
"Custody - To Which Parent?", Podell, Ralph J; Peck, Harry F.;
and First, Curry; Marq. L. Rev, 56:51 Winter T 73:
In conclusion it seems clear that the trend
particularly among the more enlightened courts is
to ignore the rigid absolutes and legalisms of
the past and adhere with increasing frequency to
the trend toward reliance on the social scientists
and expert testimony of psychologists, psychiatrists,
social investigators and other experts in the field
of human behavior.
It has further been stated that the psychiatric experts
have knowledge which can be helpful and beyond the reach of the
attorney, thus, law and psychiatry should work jointly. "Family

- 17 -

Law and Psychoanalysis - Some Observations on Interdisciplinary
Collaboration/1 Katz, Jay, M.D., Fam. L. Q. 1:69 Je. '67.

In

the landmark case of Painter v. Bannister, 258 Iowa 1390, 140
N.W. 2d 152 (1966), the Court relied heavily on the testimony
of a psychiatrist and child psychologist to place the child in
a case where neither party was declared to be unfit.
The failure of the court below to rely on the recommendations
of the psychiatrists and take into consideration the testimony
of the witnesses was an abuse of discretion of great magnitude.
B.

Preference for the mother during tender years

doctrine prevails in Utah.
The traditional policy of Utah law, despite statutory
language, all things being comparatively equal, is a child of
tender years should be placed in the custody of the mother.
Cox v Cox, Ut. 2d 532 P.2d 994 (1975), Hyde v Hyde, 22 Ut.2d
429, 454 P.2d 884, McBroom v McBroom, 14 Ut. 2d 392, 384 P. 2d
961 (1963), Steiger v Steiger, 4 Ut.2d 273, 293 P. 2d 418 (1956),
Hulse v Hulse 111 Ut. 193,

176 P. 2d 875 (1947), and Holm v.

Holm, 44 Ut. 242, 139 P. 937 (1914).
Reflecting judicial wisdom and experience, the court in
Cox v Cox, supra, stated that in considering the long-term
welfare and adjustment of children:
...we think there is wisdom in the traditional
pattern of thought that the roles of the mother
and father in the family are such that, all
other things being comparatively equal, the
children should be in the care of their mother,

- 18 especially so children of younger years; and
this may be true even when the divorce is
granted to the father.
In the instant case, both parties were granted the divorce.
Further support for the above proposition is found in other
jurisdictions: Wilson v Wilson, 199 Or. 263, 260 P.2d 952
(1955), State ex rel Hale v. Long, 36 Wash. 2d 432, 218 P.
2d 884 (1950), Kuykendall v. Kuykendall, 290 P2d 128 (Okla)
(1955) , Grimditch v Grimditch, 71 Az. 198, 225 P. 2d 489, (1950),
Hayes v Hayes 134 Colo. 315, 303 P.2d 238 (1956), Bierce v.
Hansen, 171 Kan. 422, 233 P. 2d 520 (1951), Trudgen v
Trudgen, 134 Mont. 174, 329 P. 2d 225 (1958), Stuart v
Stuart, Cal. Rptr. (1973), Cooke v Cooke
A.2d 841 (1974) Erickson v Erickson,

M.D. APPL
Minn.

, 319
220 N.W.

2d 487 (1974).
Although evidence of a father's role in the development
of a child is generally inconsistent and meager, the same
cannot be said of maternal deprivation.

It has been said:

"Despite these methodological problems and
weaknesses caused by difficulties of
execution, the sheer weight of confirmatory and
corroborative evidence regarding adverse
effects of maternal deprivation reveals the
undeniable importance of the role of the mother
in the development of her offspring." "The
Relevance of Psychological and Psychiatric
Studies to the Future Development of the Laws
Governing the Settlement of Inter-Parental
Child Custody Dispute," Adrian Bradbrook, J.
Fam. L. 11:557, '72.
The article further states that the "boldest justifiable
conclusion: is that a child of less than 7 years should be

- 19 placed in the custody of the mother.

There is some evidence

that a male child should be transferred to the father at age
7, but, in view of undesirable results of changing custody,
the better choice would be to have all children remain with
their mother throughout childhood.
In the instant case, Andrew is of the tender age of
3-1/2 (Tr. 11). The testimony shows his closeness to his
mother (Tr. 48-84, 115, 120, 160-163, 184-187, 187-194, 195197, Ex 6-P). The testimony further shows he is in the
nuturing stage where the mother's influence is indispensable
(Tr. 48-84, Ex 6-P). Thus, according to the traditional policy
of the Courts of this state, preference should be given to the
mother, she being a fit and proper person to raise Andrew.
C.

In awarding custody of minor children, the best

interests of the child is the cardinal principle.
The universally accepted principle regarding custody of
minor children is that the best interest of the child is the
controlling factor in every case. Walton v Coffman, 110
Ut 1, 169 P. 2d 97 (1946).
From the evidence presented, there is no substantial indication that Plaintiff can better serve Andrew's needs than
can the Defendant.
care.

Andrew is not in need of any specialized

The only difference may be economic.

Plaintiff's

potential and capacity to earn more money than Defendant is
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not disputed (Tr. 201-208, 264-265, Ex 5-D) . In making a custody
determination, however, financial status is to be considered,
but it is not determinative of the quality of care a child will
receive and, thus, should not be the basis for a decision.
White v. White, 29 Ut 2 148, 506 P. 2d 69 (1973).
The quality of care Andrew will receive is of concern to
all.

There is nothing to indicate Defendant has not been a

good mother, there is nothing to indicate Defendant has mistreated Andrew physically or otherwise, there is nothing to
indicate she has not fed, clothed, trained, educated and
nutured him properly and adequately, there is nothing to indicate
she has subjected him to any unwholesome or immoral environment,
and there is nothing to indicate she shall do any of the above
in the future.

She has been a sincere, concerned and loving

mother at all times.
The quality of a mother's love cannot be measured by the
difficulties of the parents.

The difficulties of the parents,

however, should not prevent the Court from measuring the
quality of the mother's love in this instance.

In spite of all

the emotional strain for both parties, the Defendant has
strained most for the best interests of the child.

Her will-

ingness to voluntarily permit Plaintiff to have possession of
the child during the pendency of the divorce is only but one
measure of her willingness to put the child's interest first
and not make him the proverbial football (Tr. 257). She should
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not be penalized for this.
Perhaps, Dr. Ferre's comments can capsulize why, in the
long term interest of Andrew, he should be awarded to Defendant;
Looking, however, toward his long term needs,
he clearly is attached to his mother. She seems
capable of continuing to provide the maternal care
but (sic) he needs. If she remarries, there is no
indication that this would adversely effect her
ability to adequately care for Andrew.
Mr. Mecham's hostility and vindictiveness in
this case is of real concern. I would anticipate
this will cause continued conflict. If Andrew
were left in his custody, I would be concerned how
Mr. Mecham's emotional problems, in this area, would
effect Andrew's future development.
Clearly a decision in this case is difficult,
but from my examination there is presently no major
reason why Mrs. Mechara should be deprived of
custody of Andrew....(EX 6-P).
The Lower Court had concern for Defendant's emotional
stability.

Obviously, the psychiatrists were more concerned,

with Plaintiff's emotional stability.
The introduction of the paternal grandparents into the
disposition of custody was, indeed, unfortunate.

Neither

grandparent was in Court to testify nor was any direct evidence
relating to their fitness given except for a comment by Dr.
Ferre who detected problems (EX 6-P). Otherwise, there is no
evidence of the age, ability, environment, relationship and
rapport concerning the grandparents.

The most disturbing

aspect of the Court's rationale was its conclusion that the
grandparents were willing to assume the major responsibility for

-
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the child (there is no evidence of this in the record) and that the child
was with the the grandparents (there is no evidence of this in the record).
Where there are two f i t parents (Tr. 51, 71, 344), how the Court makes
the leap frcm the Plaintiff, about whom the evidence is sparse regarding
his performance to care for the c h i l d , t o the grandparents, for
whom t h e r e i s even l e s s evidence, i s d i f f i c u l t t o comprehend.
Furthermore, the C o u r t ' s statement, "I d o n ' t want t o t w i s t
the child up, t h a t ' s my endeavor and p r o b l e m . . . . " i s generous,
but confusing (Tr. 342).

And, the C o u r t ' s statement about the

s p l i t custody of the c h i l d (Tr. 341) as i t was before, remains
a mystery, p a r t i c u l a r l y a t h r e e way s p l i t between the grandp a r e n t s , the P l a i n t i f f and Defendant.

The p s y c h i a t r i s t s have

also s t a t e d t h a t s t a b i l i t y i s important.

How, placing the

child with the major r e s p o n s i b i l i t y in the grandparents provides
s t a b i l i t y i s an enigma.

The child w i l l now be placed in a

four way routine between the grandparents, the f a t h e r , the
nursery school or b a b y - s i t t e r , and the mother (Tr. 88, 144,
145, 146, 329, 334, 336).

This c e r t a i n l y i s not s t a b i l i t y nor

in the best i n t e r e s t of the c h i l d .
If the child were awarded to the Defendant, Andrew would
have the most comparable s t a b i l i t y he experienced p r i o r to the
divorce, the whole a t t e n t i o n of the mother (Tr. 338, 339) and
the l i b e r a l v i s i t a t i o n r i g h t s of the f a t h e r .
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SUMMARY
Based on the record, the evidence shows the lower Court
abused its discretion and erred in its ruling granting the
care, custody and control of the minor child to the Plaintiff.
The Lower Court has found and the evidence clearly proves
the mother is a fit and stable mother.

During the period

Defendant had Andrew, he was stable and relatively free from
symptoms emanating from vibrations of a divorce.

Defendant

was a good, loving and concerned mother to Andrew.
The policy of the law in this state is to award custody
of children of tender years to the mother, all things being
comparatively equal.

The evidence shows the parties are at

least equal and, in Plaintiff's best light, he has problems
with which he must cope.
The best interest of the child should be the primary
consideration of this Court.

Based on the evidence elicited,

the facts adduced, and the policy of the law, it is in the
best interest of the child, now, and for the future, to award
custody of the child to the Defendant.
Thus, the Defendant respectfully requests that the decision
of the Lower Court be reversed, and that custody of the minor
child be awarded to Defendant subject to liberal visitation
rights to the Plaintiff and further remand this case for determination of a proper and adequate amount to be paid by Plaintiff
for the support of the child.
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